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WEIGHING THE VALUE OF INFORMATION: WHY THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD REQUIRE NUTRITION 
LABELING FOR FOOD SERVED IN RESTAURANTS 
ABSTRACT 
Obesity has become a growing public health concern in the United States.  
State and local policymakers, as well as the federal government, have 
proposed and implemented a variety of measures to curb consumption of 
unhealthy food and promote healthy lifestyles.  Providing nutrition information 
to consumers is one strategy that has been implemented, most notably in the 
Nutritional Labeling and Education Act of 1990.  Such a strategy should again 
be employed to address overconsumption and over-marketing of high calorie 
food at restaurants, as well as to remedy the patchwork of menu labeling 
requirements that has been created in recent years and continues to expand.  
This Comment uses an interdisciplinary approach to weigh the regulatory 
design options available to lawmakers to address obesity, and particularly, the 
role consumption of restaurant food plays in contributing to obesity. 
“The free market economy is predicated on the informed consumer.  It is 
the fundamental assumption about how markets work.” 
—Tom McGarity1 
“When we talk about prevention, it begins with information.” 
—California State Senator Alex Padilla2 
INTRODUCTION 
Ashley Pelman was fourteen years old, stood four feet, ten inches, and 
weighed 170 pounds when she sued McDonald’s.3  She had eaten at 
 
 1 Michael Barsa, California’s Proposition 65 and the Limits of Information Economics, 49 STAN. L. 
REV. 1223, 1226 (1997) (quoting Tom McGarity). 
 2 Press Release, Senator Alex Padilla, California State Assembly Approves SB 120 (Padilla/Migden) 
Requiring Nutrition Information on Menus and Menu Boards (Sept. 11, 2007), available at http://dist20.casen. 
govoffice.com/index.asp?Type=B_PR&SEC=%7B5EACFA15-EA6B-41D8-9711-C030F9FAD5EE%7D&DE 
=%7BFD1BBB0D-1FCE-4C2B-B3EB-5BFBF19047F3%7D. 
 3 Jonathan Wald, McDonald’s Obesity Suit Tossed, CNN MONEY, Feb. 17, 2003, http://money.cnn.com/ 
2003/01/22/news/companies/mcdonalds/. 
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McDonald’s an average of three to four times a week since she was five years 
old.4  In her suit she alleged that McDonald’s had a duty to disclose the risks of 
eating unhealthy fast food and that without such disclosure, McDonald’s was 
misleading the public.5  The Court dismissed her claim, asserting that the 
nutritional content of food from McDonald’s was common knowledge.6  It 
stated that “legal consequences should not attach to the consumption of 
hamburgers and other fast food fare unless consumers are unaware of the 
dangers of eating such food.”7  The court assumed that common sense was all 
the knowledge necessary to determine that fast food posed health risks.8 
The court’s assumption that consumers are fully aware of the risks of eating 
restaurant food is incorrect.9  In fact, consumers often cannot accurately assess 
the nutrient content of restaurant food, and false estimates of nutrient content 
distort rational consumption choices.10  While tort liability is probably not the 
best way to address the failure of consumers like Ashley Pelman to estimate 
the nutrient content of their food,11 as the court opinion hinted, a federally 
mandated nutrient disclosure law may be a sound policy alternative.12 
This Comment asserts that Congress should adopt a uniform nutrient 
disclosure law for restaurants.  It reaches this conclusion by analyzing the 
regulatory design options available to policymakers through an 
 
 4 Amended Verified Complaint at ¶ 15, Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) (No. 02 CV 7821 (RWS)). 
 5 Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp. (Pelman I), 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  The complaint 
alleged deceptive advertising, marketing unhealthy food toward children, and negligence in marketing 
addictive food.  Id. 
 6 Id. at 540–41.  However, the court allowed the plaintiffs to amend their complaint.  Id. at 543.  The 
amended complaint alleged that McDonald’s misled the plaintiffs about the nutrient quality and benefits of the 
food, failed to disclose that the food was less healthy than advertised, and misrepresented that it provided 
nutritional information in all of its stores.  Ben Falit, Fast Food Fighters Fall Flat: Plaintiffs Fail to Establish 
that McDonald’s Should Be Liable for Obesity-Related Illnesses, J.L. MED. & ETHICS, Winter 2003, at 725, 
726.  The amended complaint was also dismissed.  Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp. (Pelman II), No. 02 Civ. 
7821(RWS), 2003 WL 22052778, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2003), vacated, 396 F.3d 508 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 7 Pelman I, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 517. 
 8 Id. at 541 (“[T]he Complaint fails to allege that the McDonalds’ products consumed by the plaintiffs 
were dangerous in any way other than that which was open and obvious to a reasonable consumer.”). 
 9 See infra Part II.A.  For a criticism of the court’s assumption from a “free choice” perspective, see 
Adam Benforado et al., Broken Scales: Obesity and Justice in America, 53 EMORY L.J. 1645, 1796–98 (2004) 
(“We are pushed and pulled to eat and drink foods that are harming us by forces that are indifferent to our 
health and our freedom, and which we find incredibly difficult to see.”). 
 10 See infra Part II.A. 
 11 See infra Part IV. 
 12 See Pelman I, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 516–17 (noting several federally-mandated disclosure laws that were 
“created in those situations where individuals are somehow unable to protect themselves”). 
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interdisciplinary lens, borrowing from law and economics, cognitive 
psychology, public health, and ethics disciplines.  This Comment considers 
competing regulatory goals such as protecting consumers, preserving and 
promoting individual liberty, fostering industry efficiency, and allowing for 
state and local innovation. 
Part I outlines the legislative landscape with regard to obesity in America 
and provides an overview of actions taken to target the negative effects of food 
sold in restaurants.  Part II explains the benefits of using the nutrient disclosure 
approach and contrasts that approach with other information-based and non-
information-based approaches to combating obesity.  It argues that nutrient 
disclosure is the best tool to promote efficient decision making, combat 
obesity, and advance individual liberty.  Part III recommends the adoption of a 
federal law requiring nutrient disclosure for food served in restaurants to 
prevent a patchwork system of state and local disclosure requirements.  Part IV 
addresses preemption questions by balancing the goal of uniformity with the 
need to preserve state and local governmental authority to address specific 
community health concerns.  This Comment argues that states and localities 
should be allowed to experiment with obesity-targeting strategies that do not 
raise patchwork problems and to adopt programs that the federal government is 
unable or unsuited to implement. 
I. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND REGARDING RESTAURANT CONTRIBUTIONS TO 
OBESITY 
Obesity is a concern for policymakers because of its massive public health 
implications.  Obesity raises the incidence of coronary heart disease, type 2 
diabetes, various types of cancer, high blood pressure, high cholesterol, stroke, 
liver and gallbladder disease, sleep apnea and respiratory problems, 
osteoarthritis, and gynecological problems.13  According to National Health 
Accounts, aggregate medical spending due to excessive weight or obesity was 
$78.5 billion in 1998.14  Almost two-thirds of American adults are overweight, 
which is defined as having a body mass index (BMI) between 25 and 29.9, or 
 
 13 NAT’L CTR. FOR CHRONIC DISEASE PREVENTION & HEALTH PROMOTION, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL 
& PREVENTION (CDC), OBESITY: HALTING THE EPIDEMIC BY MAKING HEALTH EASIER 2 (2009), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/NCCDPHP/publications/AAG/pdf/obesity.pdf. 
 14 Div. of Nutrition, Physical Activity & Obesity, CDC, Overweight and Obesity: Economic 
Consequences, http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/causes/economics.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2009). 
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obese, which is defined as having a BMI of 30 or higher.15  Obesity rates have 
been on the rise for the past several decades.16  According to congressional 
findings, “increased caloric intake is a key factor contributing to the alarming 
increase in obesity in the United States.”17 
In the past two decades, the number of meals prepared or eaten outside the 
home has increased significantly.18  According to Dr. Barry Popkin, a 
nutritional epidemiologist at the University of North Carolina, “[p]eople are 
eating more, and more often . . . [a]nd the foods that they are consuming 
almost always replace meals cooked in a kitchen and eaten at a table.”19  
Studies show that “[c]hildren eat almost twice as many calories (770) when 
they eat a meal at a restaurant as they do when they eat at home (420).”20  
Restaurant meals are generally larger and have more calories than meals 
prepared at home.21  Thus, policymakers have recently targeted restaurants as 
sources of unhealthy and uninformed consumption.  This Part will outline how 
various levels of government have taken steps to promote healthy food 
consumption. 
A. Federal Action 
The federal government demonstrated its authority to regulate food 
products when Congress enacted the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) in 
1938.22  The Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 (NLEA) provided 
 
 15 Labeling Education and Nutrition Act of 2009, S. 558, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009) (LEAN Act); Div. of 
Nutrition, Physical Activity & Obesity, CDC, Overweight and Obesity: Defining Overweight and Obesity, 
http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/defining.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2009). 
 16 NAT’L CTR. FOR CHRONIC DISEASE PREVENTION & HEALTH PROMOTION, supra note 13, at 2. 
 17 Menu Education and Labeling Act, H.R. 2426, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009) (MEAL Act). 
 18 S. 3575, 110th Cong. § 2 (2008).  See Jennifer L. Pomeranz & Kelly D. Brownell, Legal and Public 
Health Considerations Affecting the Success, Reach, and Impact of Menu-Labeling Laws, 98 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 1578, 1578 (2008) (noting that “[c]onsumption of restaurant food has increased dramatically[,]” 
resulting in restaurant industry sales jumping more than $200 billion between 1997 and 2007).  The amount of 
time spent cooking in the kitchen has also decreased.  Julia Moskin, In Kitchen, ‘Losers’ Start from Scratch, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2009, at D1.  In 1965, women spent an average of thirteen hours a week cooking in the 
kitchen.  Id.  The average is now thirty minutes a day.  Id. 
 19 Moskin, supra note 18. 
 20 S.F., CAL., HEALTH CODE  art. 8, § 468.1, (2008), available at http://library.municode.com/index.aspx? 
clientId=14136&stateId=5&stateName=California. 
 21 See Home-Cooking Beats Restaurants in Calories, UPI.COM, Dec. 18, 2008, http://www.upi.com/ 
Health-News/2008/12/18/Home-cooking-beats-restaurants-in-calories/UPI-6548122962545/ (citing James K. 
Binkley, Calorie and Gram Differences Between Meals at Fast Food and Table Service Restaurants, 30 REV. 
AGRIC. ECON. 750, 750 (2008)); Pomeranz & Brownell, supra note 18, at 1578 (“Fast-food consumption is 
associated with a higher intake of calories, saturated fat, carbohydrates, and added sugars.”). 
 22 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (1938). 
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amendments to the FDCA that established a system of uniform labeling of 
certain food products in interstate commerce.23  The NLEA established 
nutritional labeling in the “Nutrition Facts” bar on most packaged food 
products and regulated labeling for products with voluntary nutritional claims 
such as “Low Fat.”24  Congressional findings indicate that about seventy-five 
percent of adults report using NLEA-mandated food labels on packaged food 
and that approximately half of people report changing their minds about 
buying food products because of the information provided.25 
1. The MEAL Act 
In 2003, Representative Rosa DeLauro and Senator Tom Harkin introduced 
identical bills—the Menu Education and Labeling Act (MEAL Act) in both 
chambers of Congress.26  The MEAL Act was also proposed in the 109th and 
110th Congresses27 and is currently pending in the 111th Congress.28  The 
MEAL Act would amend the FDCA, particularly 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(5), to 
extend labeling requirements to certain foods sold in restaurants.29  The 
purpose of the MEAL Act is “to enable customers to make informed choices 
about the nutritional content of standard menu items in large chain 
restaurants.”30  The MEAL Act would require establishments with twenty or 
more outlets nationwide to disclose the number of calories, grams of saturated 
fat plus trans fat, grams of carbohydrate, and milligrams of sodium contained 
in a standard serving of the food in a clear and conspicuous manner in a 
statement adjacent to the name of each standard menu item.31  The requirement 
would not apply to temporary menu items, such as specials.32  The MEAL Act 
would limit the exemption provided in 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(5) for restaurants 
and would add two additional sections to the end, providing specifically for 
restaurant nutrient disclosure standards.33  Notably, the MEAL Act would not 
 
 23 Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 (NLEA), Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353 (codified 
at 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2006)). 
 24 Id. 
 25 MEAL Act, H.R. 2426, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009). 
 26 MEAL Act, H.R. 3444, 108th Cong. (2003); MEAL Act, S. 2108, 108th Cong. (2004). 
 27 MEAL Act, H.R. 5563, 109th Cong. (2006); MEAL Act, S. 3483, 109th Cong. (2006); MEAL Act, 
H.R. 3895, 110th Cong. (2007); MEAL Act, S. 2784, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 28 H.R. 2426; MEAL Act, S. 1048, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 29 H.R. 2426; S. 1048.  Under current law, restaurants are explicitly exempted from section 343(q).  See 
21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(5) (2006). 
 30 H.R. 2426; S. 1048. 
 31 H.R. 2426 §3; S. 1048 § 3. 
 32 H.R. 2426 §3; S. 1048 § 3. 
 33 H.R. 2426; S. 1048. 
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preclude “a State or political subdivision of a State from requiring that a 
restaurant or similar retail food establishment or vending machine  
operator. . . provide nutrition information in addition to that required” by the 
federal law.34  Thus the Act would establish a federal floor for nutrient 
disclosure while explicitly permitting states and localities to pass more 
stringent requirements. 
2. The LEAN Act 
An alternative federal proposal pending before Congress is the Labeling 
Education and Nutrition Act (LEAN Act), introduced by Senators Thomas 
Carper and Lisa Murkowski and Representative Jim Matheson.35  The bill 
would require disclosure of calories on a menu board or sign (if used) or in the 
menu, in a menu insert, in an appendix to the menu, or in a supplemental 
menu.36  The disclosure requirements would apply to restaurant chains that 
operate twenty or more establishments.37  Other nutritional information, such 
as fat content, would have to be available at the establishment upon request.38  
The LEAN Act would preempt most state and local laws if (1) the state and 
local laws mandated different labeling standards for restaurants than were 
provided in the federal law and (2) the restaurants affected by the state or local 
laws were chains with twenty or more establishments.39  The LEAN Act is 
supported by the restaurant industry because of its express preemption 
provisions.40 
B. State and Local Action 
States and localities have proposed a wide variety of policies targeting 
obesity, many specifically aimed at restaurant food.  One approach would 
impose calorie disclosure or nutrition labeling requirements on restaurant 
chains.  Other strategies include restricting fast food restaurants through 
zoning, banning certain ingredients, and restricting the sale of certain foods to 
children in school.  Additionally, some states and localities impose taxes on 
specific foods and ingredients. 
 
 34 H.R. 2426 §3; S. 1048 § 3. 
 35 LEAN Act, S. 558, 111th Cong. (2009); LEAN Act, H.R. 1398, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 36 S. 558 § 6; H.R. 1398 § 6. 
 37 S. 558; H.R. 1398. 
 38 S. 558; H.R. 1398. 
 39 S. 558 § 7; H.R. 1398 § 7. 
 40 See infra Part III. 
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1. Nutrient Disclosure 
In 2006, the New York City Board of Health and Mental Hygiene (N.Y. 
Board) adopted Regulation 81.50 detailing calorie disclosure rules for certain 
restaurants that voluntarily provided nutrition information to the public.41  The 
regulation was challenged by the New York State Restaurant Association 
(NYSRA), and in 2007, the federal district court determined that the NLEA 
preempts the local regulation.42  Undeterred, the N.Y. Board changed its 
regulation to apply more broadly, eliminating the voluntary aspect of the 
rejected regulation.43  The NYSRA challenged the new regulation, arguing that 
federal law preempts local nutrition labeling standards.44  The district court 
upheld the second regulation on the ground that it was mandatory, not 
voluntary, and therefore not preempted.45  The Second Circuit affirmed.46 
Several California localities adopted similar labeling requirements that 
were ultimately enacted statewide.47  King County, Washington, also now 
requires nutrient disclosure by certain restaurants.48  Numerous state 
 
 41 N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health (NYSRA I), 509 F. Supp. 2d 351, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007).  Restaurants that chose to disclose nutrient information were required to comply with the rules, but 
restaurants that chose not to disclose nutrient information were not required to do so.  Id. 
 42 Id. at 363.  The court determined that NLEA preempted state laws regulating “voluntary” claims made 
by restaurants.  Id. 
 43 N.Y. CITY, HEALTH CODE § 81.50 (2008). 
 44 N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health (NYSRA II), No. 08 Civ. 1000(RJH), 2008 WL 
1752455, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2008).  The restaurant association also claimed that the law violated the 
First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech.  Id.  Both the district court and the court of appeals dismissed the 
First Amendment claim and only gave full consideration to the preemption claims.  See NYSRA II, 2008 WL 
1752455, at *13; NYSRA I, 509 F. Supp. 2d at 353. 
 45 NYSRA II, 2008 WL 1752455, at *5.  The preemption question turned on the interpretation of NLEA’s 
definition of a “claim.”  Id. at *2.  The district court held that a claim must be voluntary to fall under the 
federal definition and thus be subject to preemption.  Id.  Therefore, the voluntary disclosures regulated under 
the first version of § 81.50 were held to be claims under NLEA, but the city-mandated disclosures in the 
second version of the regulation were not and therefore not preempted by federal law.  NYSRA II, 2008 WL 
1752455, at *4–5. 
 46 N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 137 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 47 See infra Part III. 
 48 Cherie Black, County, Restaurants Strike Deal on Menus: Nutritional Data Required Only at Largest 
Chains, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 13, 2008, at B1.  The King County law requires food 
establishments with fifteen or more national locations and $1 million in annual sales to display calorie, 
saturated fat, sodium, and carbohydrate information.  ASS’N OF STATE AND TERRITORIAL HEALTH OFFICIALS, 
NUTRITION LABELING IN CHAIN RESTAURANTS: STATE AND LOCAL BILLS/REGULATIONS—2009 (2009), 
available at http://cspinet.org/new/pdf/ml_bill_summaries_09.pdf.  The King County law only applies to items 
on the menu for ninety days or more.  Id.  If items are on menu boards, the calories must be posted on the 
board.  Id. 
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legislatures have considered measures requiring nutrient content disclosure.49 
Georgia has prohibited any local action regulating the display of food nutrition 
information at food service establishments but has not established any state 
requirements.50 
2. Bans, Zoning & Taxes 
Other methods to combat obesity by influencing food consumption habits 
include the use of bans, zoning, and taxes.  For instance, New York City and 
Philadelphia have banned the use of artificial trans fat in restaurant food.51  
Artificial trans fat is found in a wide variety of foods.52  It has been targeted 
because, unlike regular fats, no health benefits are derived from consuming 
trans fats, and consumption is directly correlated with increased risk factors for 
coronary heart disease.53  Based on these concerns, California has mandated 
the elimination of trans fat in restaurants beginning in 2010, and in all baked 
goods by 2011.54  Numerous state policymakers have proposed limiting the use 
of trans fat.55 
Other policymakers have attempted to use their zoning power and control 
over schools to influence consumer behavior.  In Los Angeles, policymakers 
set a one-year moratorium on opening new fast food restaurants in a low-
income area of the city laden with chain restaurants.56  Many schools 
nationwide have banned the sale of soft drinks in an effort to curb childhood 
obesity.57  California has implemented dietary guidelines regarding what food 
 
 49 Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), Trans Fat and Menu Labeling Legislation, http://www. 
ncsl.org/Default.aspx?TabId=14362 (last visited Dec. 31, 2009); see also ASS’N OF STATE AND TERRITORIAL 
HEALTH OFFICIALS, supra note 48. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Esther Choi, Note, Trans Fat Regulation: A Legislative Remedy for America’s Heartache, 17 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 507, 509 (2008). 
 52 Id. at 516. 
 53 Id. at 521. 
 54 Press Release, Office of the Governor of the State of Cal., Gov. Schwarzenegger Signs Legislation 
Promoting Nutrition and Healthier Options, Sept. 30, 2008, available at http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/print-
version/press-release/10682. 
 55 NCSL, supra note 49. 
 56 William Saletan, Food Apartheid: Banning Fast Food in Poor Neighborhoods, SLATE, July 31, 2008, 
http://www.slate.com/id/2196397/?from=rss. 
 57 Eric Nagourney, Soda Ban in Schools Has Little Impact, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2008, at F6.  See also 
Posting of Tara Parker-Pope to N.Y. Times Well Blog, Are Schools Really to Blame for Poor Eating?, http:// 
well.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/10/are-schools-really-to-blame-for-poor-eating/ (Nov. 10, 2008, 14:17 EST) 
(explaining efforts taken in schools, such as limiting soft drink sales and restricting the types of foods that can 
be sold to students). 
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can be served in schools.58  A number of states have also proposed limiting the 
sale or distribution of trans fats in schools.59  Additionally, several states have 
chosen to impose taxes on particular food items such as candy, soft drinks, 
chocolate milk, and pastries to deter consumers from purchasing what 
lawmakers deem unhealthy food.60 
II. THE APPEAL OF NUTRIENT DISCLOSURE 
Requiring restaurants to provide on-the-spot nutrition information about 
their products, as several states and localities have done,61 would fill the gap 
left in the NLEA with regard to restaurants.62  This Part will demonstrate why 
nutrient disclosure is the most appropriate tool for the government to pursue in 
curbing the effect of restaurant food on obesity rates and public health 
generally.  First, disclosure is a valuable tool to address the obesity problem 
because it facilitates consumer decision making and corrects inaccurate 
nutrient estimation that leads to overconsumption of unhealthy foods.  As a 
consequence, mandatory disclosure could induce producers to respond to 
consumer demand for healthy food or smaller portions.  Second, several moral 
and social arguments support the adoption of mandatory nutrient disclosure. 
A. Promoting Health Through Information-Based Decision Making 
Providing information to consumers would promote public health and curb 
obesity because proper nutrition labeling would lower information costs and 
allow consumers to better exercise personal preferences regarding the 
nutritional content of their food.  Furthermore, informational approaches 
preserve the authority of restaurants to make rational responses to changes in 
demand and provide healthy menu alternatives.   
 
 58 Sch. Nutrition Ass’n, New California School Nutrition Standards Go into Effect (July 3, 2007), http:// 
www.schoolnutrition.org/Content.aspx?id=7902. 
 59 NCSL, supra note 49.  Several of the proposals limiting trans fats would only apply to food served in 
schools.  Id. 
 60 Michael F. Jacobson & Kelly D. Brownell, Small Taxes on Soft Drinks and Snack Foods to Promote 
Health, 90 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 854, 854 (2000). 
 61 See supra Part I.B.1. 
 62 See supra Part I.A.  See also Harold Goldstein & Eric Schlosser, Op-Ed., Putting Health on the Menu, 
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2008, at A15. (“Since 1994, federal law has required nutritional labels on packaged 
foods. . . .  Fast-food and chain restaurants have thus far managed to avoid such a legal requirement, despite 
the fact that almost half the money Americans spend on food is spent at restaurants.”). 
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1. Consumer Reaction 
Nutrient disclosure on menus would improve public health by enabling 
consumers to make informed on-the-spot decisions about their consumption.  
Consumers deciding between multiple menu items would be able to weigh the 
nutritional quality of each item against other factors such as taste and price and 
make a final decision based on personal concerns about health and wellness.  
As explained by Magat and Viscusi, market failure commonly occurs when 
individual consumers do not have full information about the risks they face and 
“inadequate information distorts the mix and amount of products that 
consumers purchase.”63  Five consumer decisions could be affected by 
disclosure of nutrient information: (1) whether to eat at a restaurant versus 
preparing a meal at home, (2) whether to eat at a particular restaurant versus 
eating at a different restaurant, (3) whether to order a particular item versus a 
different item on the same menu, (4) whether to order additional items, and (5) 
whether to change future behavior, such as increasing exercise or reducing 
consumption of food outside the restaurant to offset the calories consumed.  At 
each decision point, a consumer’s choices may be skewed by a lack of 
information regarding nutrient quantities, and this skewed information may 
lead to overconsumption.64 
a. Overconsumption Without Labeling 
Without easily accessible nutrition information at restaurants, consumers 
operate with bounded rationality—that is, they “respond rationally to their own 
cognitive limitations, minimizing the sum of decision and error costs.”65  When 
consumers lack information that is relevant to purchasing decisions, they base 
their decisions on assumptions about what they expect the information would 
be.66  However, rational choices made with such limited information in this 
case can lead to overconsumption,67 possibly at each of the five decision points 
described above, contributing to the obesity problem.  The first four decision 
 
 63 WESLEY A. MAGAT & W. KIP VISCUSI, INFORMATIONAL APPROACHES TO REGULATION 87 (1992).  
The distorted consumption in turn affects firms’ incentives to produce safe products.  Id.; see also infra Part 
II.A.2 (discussing producer reaction). 
 64 See MAGAT & VISCUSI, supra note 63, at 87 (explaining how a lack of information can inefficiently 
distort consumption). 
 65 Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477 
(1998). 
 66 Lary Lawrence, Toward a More Efficient and Just Economy: An Argument for Limited Enforcement of 
Consumer Promises, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 815, 818 (1987). 
 67 Id. 
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points—(1) restaurant vs. home, (2) restaurant vs. restaurant, (3) item vs. item, 
and (4) more items vs. fewer items—involve consumers’ interactions with 
restaurants, such as where they go, what they order, and how much they order, 
while the last focuses on consumers’ individual behaviors that balance 
increased consumption now with later behaviors.  Consumer studies show that 
the lack of labeling may contribute to overconsumption of unhealthy foods at 
each point.68 
First, evidence shows that consumers cannot accurately estimate nutrient 
levels without menu labeling.69  Research has revealed that consumers 
significantly underestimate the calorie, fat, and saturated fat levels of less-
healthful restaurant items.70  According to one study, Americans underestimate 
the caloric content of restaurant food by approximately 55% on average.71  In 
another study, nine out of ten people underestimated the caloric content of 
certain less healthful items by an average of 600 calories, which was almost 
half the actual caloric content.72  The proliferation of large portions 
exacerbates this problem because larger portions lead to a larger disparity 
between estimated and actual caloric content.73 
Counter to the court’s conclusion in Pelman I, consumers may be aware 
that restaurant foods pose health risks,74 but, for a variety of reasons, they 
consistently underestimate the degree to which such food may harm them 
because of inaccurate nutrient estimates.75  This gap between consumers’ 
 
 68 See Mary T. Bassett et al., Purchasing Behavior and Calorie Information at Fast-Food Chains in New 
York City, 2007, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1457, 1457–59 (2008) (explaining that consumers order lower-calorie 
menu items when they see calorie information at Subway restaurants prior to ordering); Scot Burton et al., 
Attacking the Obesity Epidemic: The Potential Health Benefits of Providing Nutrition Information in 
Restaurants, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1669, 1669 (2006) (explaining that consumers significantly underestimate 
the calorie, fat, and saturated fat levels of less-healthful restaurant items); Michael A. McCann, Economic 
Efficiency and Consumer Choice Theory in Nutritional Labeling, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1161, 1176 (2004) 
(explaining that consumers consistently underestimate unhealthy contents of restaurant items); John Tierney, 
Health Halo Can Hide the Calories, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2008, at D1 (explaining how a “health halo” may 
affect where consumers choose to eat and whether they order additional side items). 
 69 See Burton et al., supra note 68, at 1669; McCann, supra note 68, at 1176. 
 70 See Burton et al., supra note 68, at 1669 (“Survey results showed that levels of calories, fat, and 
saturated fat in less-healthful restaurant food items were significantly underestimated by consumers.”); 
McCann, supra note 68, at 1176 (citing studies indicating consistent calorie underestimation). 
 71 McCann, supra note 68, at 1176 (citing studies commissioned by New York University and the 
University of Mississippi). 
 72 Burton et al., supra note 68, at 1674. 
 73 McCann, supra note 68, at 1176; see also Pomeranz & Brownell, supra note 18, at 1578 (“Increasing 
portion size has made calorie estimation more difficult.”). 
 74 Pelman I, 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 75 McCann, supra note 68, at 1176. 
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estimates and actual nutrient content may be related to restaurants’ use of 
unfamiliar ingredients or preparation techniques.  For example: 
Sold only to the food-service market, Kraft Extra Heavy Mayonnaise 
is advertised to restaurant operators as providing “superior binding 
and cling.”  This awful stuff has 90 calories per tablespoon, versus 27 
calories in Kraft’s plenty-tasty Miracle Whip dressing and 18 calories 
in Hellmann’s Reduced Fat Mayonnaise.  People know mayo is a rich 
substance, but I bet no one thinks restaurants are stealthily serving a 
fat-crammed “extra heavy” version . . . [Kraft] even recommends 
Extra Heavy Mayonnaise for “prepared salads and salad dressings.”  
That is, Kraft recommends that menu items consumers assume to be 
healthy alternatives instead be larded up with high amounts of fat.76 
Restaurants may also use more butter or oil and more salt than a home cook 
would while preparing the same dish, and many people have “very little 
understanding of how much fat and salt is in restaurant food . . . even on the 
supposedly healthy part of the menu.”77  Studies also show that meals at both 
fast food and table service restaurants are larger and have more calories than 
meals prepared at home.78 
Furthermore, labeling efforts that do not disclose calories but indicate some 
other healthy trait of the food, such as being trans fat-free, create what is called 
the “health halo” and may further distort calorie estimates.79  One study 
surveyed nutritionally-informed consumers about the number of calories in a 
meal.80  Half the consumers were shown pictures of the meal including two 
crackers prominently labeled “Trans Fat Free.”81  The other half were shown 
pictures without the crackers.82  The consumers shown pictures with the 
crackers estimated the meal to have 176 fewer calories than did the consumers 
who were shown pictures without the crackers.83  Although the crackers added 
100 calories to the meal, “their presence skewed people’s estimates in the 
opposite direction.”84  Another study showed that “healthy” restaurants such as 
 
 76 Gregg Easterbrook, Hidden Calories, ESPN.COM, Nov. 20, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print? 
id=3709103&type=story. 
 77 Moskin, supra note 18 (quoting nutritionist Cheryl Forberg). 
 78 UPI.COM, supra note 21. 
 79 Tierney, supra note 68. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
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Subway might have created a distorting “health halo” around their food.85  The 
study gave people the choice between a Subway sandwich and a Big Mac, 
which actually had fewer calories.86  Those participants that chose the 
sandwich over the Big Mac were more likely to add a large non-diet soda and 
cookies to the order, ending up with, on average, 56% more calories than 
contained in the McDonald’s meal.87  The McDonald’s–Subway comparison 
study clearly demonstrates consumers’ faulty beliefs associated with where to 
eat and how much to order (decision points 2 and 4).88 
False estimates of nutrient content distort decision making because 
consumers rely on these estimates when ordering off a restaurant menu.89  By 
relying on these false premises, consumers misinterpret the consequences of 
their consumption and thus make inefficient decisions—decisions that fail to 
maximize the utility of their purchases.90  Consistent underestimation of 
calories in restaurant foods results in overconsumption at each of the five 
decision points for those having preferences for lower calorie foods.91 
Second, not only do consumers make skewed estimations about calorie 
content, by they have some preference for lower calorie options.  Consumers in 
a study who were provided caloric information at Subway often chose lower-
calorie options than consumers without caloric information.92  This 
demonstrates that not only do consumers make skewed estimations about 
calorie content, but they have some preference for lower calorie options.  Thus 
it would appear that the consumption of high-calorie menu items is due not 
only to a mere preference in taste, texture, and price, but also to these skewed 
calorie estimations.93  These study results imply that if consumers had accurate 
 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 McCann, supra note 68, at 1176–77. 
 90 See id. (“[W]hen individuals rely on false premises in purchasing fast food, they misinterpret the 
consequences and content of their selections, and thus fail to achieve maximum utility for their purchasing 
power.”). 
 91 See MAGAT & VISCUSI, supra note 63, at 87 (“[I]nadequate information distorts the mix and amount of 
products that consumers purchase . . . ”).  If provided with nutritional information, the consumers preferring a 
lower calorie lifestyle may choose to eat at restaurants less often (decision point 1), may choose restaurants 
with healthy menu options more often (decision point 2), may order healthier items more frequently (decision 
point 3), may order fewer menu items at each meal (decision point 4), and may offset the calories consumed at 
restaurants more often (decision point 5). 
 92 Bassett et al., supra note 68, at 1457–59. 
 93 See id. (providing evidence that when consumers are given calorie information about menu items, they 
order lower calorie options than they do in the absence of the information). 
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information, they would make different, less consumptive choices than they do 
without nutrient disclosure.94 
b. Correcting the Overconsumption 
The basic assumption of rational decision making is that providing 
information creates better decisions and “an ideal law would seek to provide 
consumers with enough information to make their own risk–benefit tradeoffs 
in the marketplace.”95  However, scholars have pointed out limits to the theory 
that more information correlates with better decisions.  In particular, “the 
information must enhance consumer decision making.”96  Besides the 
economic theory and isolated studies discussed above, past experience with 
nutritional labeling demonstrates the effect of nutrient disclosure on consumer 
choice.97  The fact that nutritional labeling helps consumers make rational 
choices can be illustrated by two examples: The effect of the NLEA on the 
salad dressing market and the value of the warning labels mandated by 
California’s Proposition 65. 
i. Past Examples: Salad Dressing and Cereal 
Before the passage of the NLEA, nutrition labels on food products sold in 
stores were voluntary.98  Low-fat dressings were often labeled and higher fat 
dressings generally were not.99  Some economists suggested, based on 
“unraveling” theory, that under a voluntary labeling system consumers would 
infer that nonlabeled dressings were unhealthy and would adjust their 
purchasing behavior accordingly.  Under this theory, then, mandatory labeling 
would not affect consumer perception of the nutritional qualities of salad 
dressing.100  However, when the NLEA came into effect, requiring mandatory 
nutrient disclosure for all dressings, sales of high-fat dressings declined 
significantly.101  Based on this evidence, it seems that consumers acquire and 
 
 94 Id.  This behavior goes directly to decisions made at decision point 3—what menu item to order at a 
given restaurant. 
 95 Barsa, supra note 1, at 1226. 
 96 Id. at 1227. 
 97 Alan D. Mathios, The Impact of Mandatory Disclosure Laws on Product Choices: An Analysis of the 
Salad Dressing Market, 43 J.L. & ECON. 651, 665–667 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, Informing America: Risk, 
Disclosure, and the First Amendment, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 653, 671 (1993). 
 98 Mathios, supra note 97, at 651. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. at 652–53. 
 101 Id. at 667. 
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comprehend more information about nutrient content under a mandatory 
labeling regime than a voluntary one and decrease their consumption of 
unhealthy food products as a result.102 
The market for high-fiber cereal also provides a telling example of how 
information can change consumption habits.  In 1984, the Kellogg Company, a 
leading marketer of breakfast cereal products, began advertising its All-Bran 
cereal as high in fiber and claiming that a high-fiber diet could reduce the risk 
of cancer.  Other high-fiber cereals were soon similarly labeled.103  Within 
three years, consumers had substantially increased their consumption of high-
fiber cereals, and, notably, the greatest gains occurred among the least 
advantaged consumers.104  Both the market share for high-fiber cereals and the 
actual sales from these cereals increased, leading to the introduction of yet 
more high-fiber products.105  This example illustrates how the public made 
healthful purchasing decisions in response to information provided through 
accurate nutrient labeling. 
ii. Contrasting Warning Labels 
In an effort to provide information about health risks, a few states have 
proposed mandatory warning labels for certain high-fat menu items instead of 
requiring nutrient disclosure.106  When analyzing the value of warning labels as 
informational tools, Viscusi laid out a clear approach: effectiveness of 
information should be evaluated on its ability to promote understanding of 
risks and rational decision making based on those risks.107  Under this standard 
nutrient disclosure would be a more useful tool for fighting obesity than 
warning labels. 
 
 102 Id. at 674–75. 
 103 J. Howard Beales, Remarks Before the Food and Drug Law Institute Conference on Qualified Health 
Claims, 3–4 (Jan. 14, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/beales/040114foodanddruglawinstitute. 
pdf. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Ctr. for Consumer Freedom, Menu Labeling Legislation: An Overview (Nov. 12, 2003), http://www. 
consumerfreedom.com/news_detail.cfm?headline=2215. 
 107 Barsa, supra note 1, at 1227 (“When judging an informational effort, the reference point should be 
whether it promotes individual understanding of the risks and subsequent rational decisions with respect to 
them.” (quoting W. KIP VISCUSI, PRODUCT–RISK LABELING: A FEDERAL RESPONSIBILITY 3 (1993)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
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Requiring warning labels108 would be a drastically less precise, and 
possibly biased, method of informing consumers about the health risks 
associated with restaurant food.  Rather than aiding in decision making, 
warning labels can cause over-reactive behavior, as scholars have noted with 
regard to California’s Proposition 65 warning labels.109  Furthermore, warning 
labels fail to address any health benefits the products might offer.110  Imprecise 
warning labels “may lead consumers to substitute a higher risk product for a 
lower risk product that bears an alarming warning.”111  This problem is less 
likely to occur with nutrient disclosure because it is quantitative, not 
qualitative and provides better information regarding specific risks.112  Nutrient 
disclosure treats food as both a potential risk and a potential benefit without 
casting judgment.  For these reasons, calorie disclosures and comprehensive 
nutrition labels, help consumers make more informed and unbiased decisions 
about their food consumption. 
iii. Information That Would Aid Decision Making 
A large body of research indicates that more information does not always 
result in more efficient decisions.113  The quantity and type of information 
presented and the way it is presented can affect how information is interpreted 
and used.114  While providing information in some circumstances may not 
promote efficient decision making,115 numeric nutrition labeling such as 
 
 108 For instance, statutes or ordinances could require a warning next to menu items containing fat or 
calories that may contribute to obesity or related negative health effects. 
 109 See Sunstein, supra note 97, at 667 (“If people are told, for example, that a certain substance causes 
cancer, they may think it is far more dangerous than it is in fact.  But some carcinogenic substances pose little 
risk.”); Barsa, supra note 1, at 1230 (“This discrepancy between warning and actual risk undermines the 
purported benefits of the information economics approach and could produce severe problems.  It undermines 
personal liberty and economic efficiency by distorting consumer decisionmaking—leading consumers to avoid 
products they would otherwise consume, given free choice and full information.”). 
 110 See William Saletan, Junk-Food Jihad: Should We Regulate French Fries Like Cigarettes?, SLATE, 
Apr. 15, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2139941/ (“Something about food—the fact that it keeps us alive, 
perhaps—makes its purveyors hard to hate.”). 
 111 Barsa, supra note 1, at 1231. 
 112 See Sunstein, supra note 97, at 670 (“Well-tailored programs would minimize the relevant risks by 
putting the information in its most understandable form.  Instead of labeling a substance a ‘carcinogen,’ a 
uniform system of risk regulation could give better awareness of risk levels.”). 
 113 See MAGAT & VISCUSI, supra note 63, at 88 (“It is now well accepted that people have limits on the 
amount of information that they can process.”). 
 114 Id.  See also Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1161 (2003) (“[T]he design features of both legal and organizational rules have 
surprisingly powerful influences on people’s choices.”). 
 115 See, e.g., Barsa, supra note 1, at 1230; MAGAT & VISCUSI, supra note 63, at 88; Sunstein, supra note 
97, at 667; Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 114. 
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mandatory calorie disclosure on menus can avoid informational traps, such as 
those associated with imprecise warning labels.116  The particular requirements 
of the law should be determined after extensive study and with input from 
experts and interested parties.117  However, any nutrient disclosure law should 
require at least, and perhaps at most, the listing of calorie information on 
menus to balance the competing goals of comprehensibility and accessibility. 
To aid consumers, the information provided must be easy to understand.118  
Therefore, policymakers should be sure to avoid creating so much clutter on 
menus that consumers cannot easily process the information.119  Providing 
detailed information about all nutrients, especially on menus, may not aid in 
good decision making because “consumers do not have the resource or the 
abilities necessary to process the total amount of information which might 
potentially be available for making any particular choice.”120  Given that 
ordering decisions are often made quickly, without time to process large 
amounts of information, and given that restaurants may have difficulty 
constructing a comprehensible menu with so much information, it may be 
prudent to limit the disclosure on the menu to calorie information only.  More 
comprehensive disclosure still can be accomplished through informational 
pamphlets that accompany menus or are readily accessible elsewhere in the 
restaurant.  Providing calorie information is a reasonably good proxy for 
disclosing nutritional content because consumption of excess calories is the 
root cause of weight gain.121 
The information must also be accessible.  As Judge Posner notes, “it would 
be profoundly irrational to spend all one’s time in the acquisition of 
 
 116 See supra Part II.A.1.b.ii. 
 117 When developing the “Nutrition Facts” label, the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the Food and 
Drug Administration asked the National Academy of Sciences to provide options for improving the label.  
John McCutcheon, Nutrition Labeling Initiative, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 409, 409 (1994). 
 118 Peter S. Menell, Structuring a Market-Oriented Federal Eco-Information Policy, 54 MD. L. REV. 
1435, 1440 (1995) (considering comprehensibility a key factor for evaluating information policies). 
 119 Under California S.B. 120, menu boards would only be required to list calories—not other nutritional 
information—because of space limitations.  Press Release, Senator Alex Padilla, supra note 2. 
 120 MAGAT & VISCUSI, supra note 63, at 88 (quoting Bettman’s review of the relevant literature in JAMES 
R. BETTMAN, AN INFORMATION PROCESSING THEORY OF CONSUMER CHOICE 177 (1979)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 121 See Div. of Nutrition, Physical Activity & Obesity, Nat’l Ctr. for Chronic Disease Prevention & Health 
Promotion, CDC, Overweight and Obesity: Causes and Consequences, http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/causes/ 
index.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2009) (“Overweight and obesity result from an energy imbalance.  This 
involves eating too many calories and not getting enough physical activity.”). 
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information.”122  Because consumers will not spend a lot of time acquiring 
information when making decisions,123 nutritional information should be 
disclosed on menus and menu boards instead of in behind-the-counter binders 
or on the restaurant website.124  While some health-conscious consumers may 
seek nutritional information before making their consumption decisions, the 
effort involved is too burdensome for most consumers.125  Furthermore, when 
information is not readily accessible through prominent displays, restaurant-
goers may not know the information is available to them at all or may assume 
that their estimates of nutrient contents are accurate, which will lower the 
incentive to spend time and energy gathering additional information.126  
According to the New York City Department of Health, only five percent of 
consumers at McDonald’s and three percent of consumers at Starbucks use the 
pamphlets supplied.127  Excluding Subway, only four percent of New York 
City restaurant patrons reported seeing calorie information provided in 2007, 
prior to the mandatory disclosure law.128 
2. Restaurant Reaction 
Restaurants would also likely change their behavior if required to disclose 
nutrition information.  Because nutritional information is not currently 
provided to restaurant consumers in a meaningful way—and nutrition is 
therefore less of a factor in purchases—preferences for healthy food 
alternatives are less important to the restaurant industry.  With the adoption of 
a nutrient disclosure program, restaurants would likely have an incentive to 
change the ingredients, cooking methods, or portion sizes of some menu items 
to offer healthful options to consumers.  The information provided by 
restaurants would enable consumers to weigh the nutrition information in their 
menu selection and better express preferences to food producers.  For example, 
calorie disclosures could encourage restaurants to offer smaller portions.129  
Restaurants respond to consumer preferences as a natural, rational way to 
 
 122 Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 
1553 (1998). 
 123 See George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961). 
 124 Goldstein & Schlosser, supra note 62. 
 125 See Stigler, supra note 123, at 223. 
 126 Moskin, supra note 18. 
 127 Goldstein & Schlosser, supra note 62 (citing a New York City Department of Health study). 
 128 Bassett et al., supra note 68, at 1458. 
 129 See Merritt Watts, I Ate What?!, SELF, Oct. 2008, at 140 (quoting TV producer Daria Klenert as 
saying, “I wish they had smaller portions” and noting that she opts for restaurants with small portions). 
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maximize profits.130  Requiring nutrition information creates an incentive to 
compete on the basis of nutritional quality.131  Restaurants affected by the New 
York calorie disclosure law have had to focus on the nutritional content of their 
food.132  This promotes efficiency because restaurants that adjust to consumer 
demand for nutritious options should lose fewer customers and could perhaps 
increase profits by supplying smaller portions for the same cost or by wooing 
customers away from less healthy restaurants.133  For instance, in reviewing the 
effects of the New York City calorie disclosure law, one writer noted that 
restaurants have reduced portion sizes and “slimmed down” menus without 
dropping prices or losing sales.134 
The effect of required disclosure on producers can be seen through study of 
California’s Proposition 65, which mandates warning labels on products 
containing certain levels of harmful or cancer-causing agents.135  Proposition 
65 “supplies powerful incentives for manufacturers to become informed about 
and possibly reduce the carcinogens and teratogens in their products.”136  To 
avoid the warning label, some industries have reduced or eliminated the use of 
toxic chemicals, demonstrating that “scholars should not limit the debate over 
Proposition 65’s merits to the question of whether the warnings help 
consumers to make purchasing decisions.”137  This example indicates that 
restaurants may, in trying to avoid categorization by consumers as an 
 
 130 See Press Release, Cal. Rest. Ass’n, California Restaurant Association Voices Disappointment in 
Passage of SB 120 (Sept. 12, 2007), available at http://www.calrest.org/go/CRA/news-events/newsroom/ 
press-releases/cra-voices-disappointment-in-passage-of-sb-120/ (“The restaurant industry is an industry of 
choice and is driven by consumer demand.  We have every incentive to serve our customers the food they 
want.  As a result more and more establishments are offering healthy menu options—customers are in turn 
rewarding these restaurants with more business.”). 
 131 Beales et al., The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J.L. & ECON. 491, 492 (1981).  See 
also Nicole Fradette et al., The Impact of the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 on the Food 
Industry, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 605, 616 (1995) (explaining that after passage of the NLEA, companies must 
choose between leaving the product as is or reformulating it, and noting that industry experts believe that 
producers will maintain current products while developing new products that are more nutritionally appealing). 
 132 Melinda Beck, On the Table: The Calories Lurking in Restaurant Food, WALL ST. J., July 29, 2008, at 
D1 (quoting Così’s chief marketing officer Chris Carroll as saying, “Having to post this information in New 
York really focused us on paying attention as well.”). 
 133 See Goldstein & Schlosser, supra note 62 (“Chains that sell good-tasting, lower-calorie foods will be 
rewarded; chains that don’t may see their sales decline.  That’s how the free market is supposed to work.”). 
 134 Kim Severson, Calories Do Count, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2008, at D1. 
 135 See Barsa, supra note 1. 
 136 Id. at 1239. 
 137 Id. 
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unhealthy restaurant, change their menus or recipes to provide healthier 
options.138 
It is true that even without menu labeling requirements, restaurants have 
attempted to market healthy alternatives to the public,139 but often those 
attempts have not been successful.140  However, the statement by Hardee’s 
director of public affairs that “people are talking nutrition, but . . . buy[ing] on 
taste,”141 also may be incorrect.  Even when healthy menu items are available 
to the public, because consumers’ baseline estimates of the nutritional quality 
of menu items is skewed, consumers’ perceive the nutritional differences 
between the healthier menu items and the less-healthy ones to be smaller than 
they actually are.142 
B. Moral and Social Arguments 
In addition to the argument that providing information would improve 
public health by enabling consumers to exercise their preferences for healthier 
foods, several moral and social arguments support adopting nutrient disclosure 
instead of government restrictions.  First, incomplete information can be an 
obstacle to liberty.  Second, programs that restrict the availability or increase 
price of certain foods or ingredients are inherently paternalistic and therefore 
restrict liberty.  Third, other approaches may increase discrimination against 
obese people. 
1. The Lack of Information as an Obstacle to Liberty 
According to Sunstein, consumers deprived of relevant information about 
what they consume are deprived of the ability to choose their preferred mix of 
risks and benefits and cannot make informed choices among possible 
 
 138 See id. (“[S]ome industries have successfully avoided mandated warnings by reducing or eliminating 
their use of certain toxic chemicals.”). 
 139 See McCann, supra note 68, at 1204 (explaining that such items and “light menus” reflect market 
preferences and have been introduced to generate profits rather than in response to government mandates).  
From 1990 to 1997, fast food restaurants increasingly offered healthier menu choices partly in response to 
public demand and “pressure from health-conscious groups.”  Id. 
 140 Id. at 1204–05.  Taco Bell, Kentucky Fried Chicken, Pizza Hut, McDonald’s, and Hardee’s all have 
introduced or considered introducing healthy alternatives but found insufficient market demand.  Id. 
 141 Id. at 1206 (citing People Talk Lean Hamburgers but Buy Fatty Patties, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Dec. 26, 
1992, at 38 (quoting Maurice Bridges, Hardee’s director of public affairs)). 
 142 See id. (“[W]hile a customer may obviously recognize that a low-fat salad menu item is less fattening 
than a double cheeseburger, the customer remains unaware of the precise fat content of that double 
cheeseburger.”) 
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options.143  “If people are unaware of the consequences of their choices, they 
are, to that extent, less free.”144  This sentiment has been echoed in a variety of 
choice situations, such as entering an employment relationship,145 opting to 
receive medical care,146 and agreeing to take out a loan.147  This argument has 
also been applied in the consumer products setting with regard to consumer 
promises made without full information.148  Applying this notion of 
information-as-freedom, disclosure of nutrient contents would give consumers 
more freedom when making consumption choices and would expand their 
individual autonomy. 
2. Paternalism as an Obstacle to Liberty 
The paternalism associated with other methods of combating obesity is 
another reason to favor nutrient labeling.149  Regulations that are not based on 
information disclosure can be economically irrational and paternalistic; 
therefore, policymakers have moved away from them.150  Paternalistic 
measures offend notions of liberty because they diminish the role of the 
individual151 and fail to allow individuals to “opt out” of specified 
arrangements.152  Approaches such as ingredient bans and zoning restrictions, 
 
 143 Sunstein, supra note 97, at 659.  See also Goldstein & Schlosser, supra note 62 (“If we can force the 
oil companies to tell us what’s best for our cars, surely we can demand that the fast-food and restaurant chains 
tell us what we’re putting into our bodies.”). 
 144 Sunstein, supra note 97, at 655. 
 145 See Note, Occupational Health Risks and the Worker’s Right to Know, 90 YALE L.J. 1792, 1793 
(1981) (arguing that health risks of employment should be disclosed out of respect for the autonomy of 
individuals in making basic life decisions). 
 146 See, e.g., Marjorie Maguire Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected 
Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219 (1985) (arguing that personal autonomy in medical decision making should be a 
legally protected right); Andrea Peterson Woolley, Informed Consent to Immunization: The Risks and Benefits 
of Individual Autonomy, 65 CAL. L. REV. 1286, 1288 (1977) (“To make an intelligent decision, the individual 
must be informed of the procedure’s risks and benefits.”). 
 147 See Note, Direct Loan Financing of Consumer Purchases, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1429 (1972) 
(asserting that a duty of disclosure is appropriate in the absence of meaningful buying power because the buyer 
has no “real chance to protect himself against unscrupulous sellers and lenders”). 
 148 See Lawrence, supra note 66, at 830 (“When a person does not have sufficient information he cannot 
knowingly choose his own destiny . . . .”). 
 149 Here, the word “paternalism” refers to the non-libertarian variety.  See Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 
114, at 1162 (“Libertarian paternalism is a relatively weak and nonintrusive type of paternalism, because 
choices are not blocked or fenced off.”). 
 150 Beales et al., supra note 131. 
 151 See Sunstein, supra note 97, at 659 (explaining how restrictions “unnecessarily diminish the role of the 
individual decisions and choices in forming individual lives”). 
 152 See Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 114, at 1161 (explaining the libertarian aspect of the “libertarian 
paternalism” strategy and asserting that they “do not aim to defend any approach that blocks individual 
choices”). 
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which are based on controlling access or behavior instead of providing 
information, prevent food producers and consumers from deciding what they 
want to produce or consume or where they want to produce or consume it.153  
These strategies foreclose private choice and therefore disserve liberty.154  
Instead, interventions should be “compatible with consumer and seller 
incentives”155 and should allow people to opt out of the specified 
arrangement.156  Providing sufficient information for consumer protection, 
including nutrient disclosure, is one such intervention.157  Nutrient disclosure 
allows people to make healthier choices based on accurate information,158 
while permitting them to continue to consume less healthy products if they 
prefer. 
Liberty concerns also arise when non-information-based regulations are 
paternalistic toward a select group of individuals.159  For instance, according to 
critics, the Los Angeles City Council “apparently felt that residents of [certain] 
neighborhoods—residents who are disproportionately African-American and 
Latino—cannot decide for themselves what to consume” and therefore enacted 
a moratorium on new fast food restaurants in those areas.160  The idea that the 
food options of certain consumers should be restricted based on factors such as 
race, socioeconomic status, or weight implies that those groups need special 
restrictions on their liberty.161 
 
 153 For example, ingredient bans may force restaurants to reformulate their recipes and change the tastes 
or textures of their products, or even remove items from their menus.  See Choi, supra note 51, at 507 (“For the 
past fifty years, trans fat has been enhancing the overall taste, texture, and quality of processed food by 
keeping cakes moist, cookies crispy, chips crunchy, and breads soft.”)  Restrictive zoning of fast food 
restaurants has also been criticized as too restrictive of personal liberty.  See, e.g., Saletan, supra note 56 
(“We’re not talking anymore about preaching diet and exercise, disclosing calorie counts, or restricting sodas 
in schools.  We’re talking about banning the sale of food to adults.  Treating French fries like cigarettes or 
liquor.  I didn’t think this would happen in the United States anytime soon.  I was wrong.”). 
 154 Sunstein, supra note 97, at 659. 
 155 Beales et al., supra note 131, at 491. 
 156 See Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 114, at 1161 (explaining the libertarian aspect of the “libertarian 
paternalism” strategy). 
 157 Beales et al., supra note 131, at 491. 
 158 See supra Part II.A. 
 159 This excludes paternalism based on status as a minor, which is generally accepted. 
 160 John Cloud, Top 10 Everything of 2008: Food Trends; Nanny-State Food Regulations, TIME.COM, 
http://www.time.com/time/specials/2008/top10/article/0,30583,1855948_1864255_1864257,00.html. 
 161 See, e.g., Aviam Soifer, The Paradox of Paternalism and Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism: United 
States Supreme Court, 1888–1921, 5 LAW & HIST. REV. 249, 250–51 n.4 (1987) (listing several Supreme 
Court decisions in which the Court announced that “it is within the undoubted power [of Congress] to restrain 
some individuals from some contracts” with regard to women, while rejecting such protections for men 
(quoting Frisbie v. United States, 157 U.S. 160, 165 (1895))); William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1798 (1998) (“The system’s treatment of crack relative to other drugs is a kind of 
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Nutrient disclosure, however, protects consumers by providing them with 
improved decision-making capabilities162 instead of dictating their decisions.  
Any changes in the selection of ingredients or cooking methods as a result of 
calorie disclosure would be market-driven and based on consumer valuations 
of nutrient levels, not the result of outright bans based on a certain level of 
risk.163  Meanwhile, universal nutrient disclosure would avoid problems with 
unequal liberty. 
3. Preventing Discrimination Based on Obesity 
Adopting nutrient disclosure instead of other anti-obesity policies, avoids 
restrictions that discriminate against obese people and is less likely to reinforce 
the perception that obese people are inferior.164  Such restrictions could intrude 
on individual choice by banning particular ingredients or, more worrisome, by 
controlling behavior through diet modification or drug therapy.165  Critics of 
government action regarding the obesity problem in America sometimes claim 
that a “war on obesity” would further stigmatize the obese by legitimizing 
negative attitudes.  Likewise, promoting restrictions on obese people “could be 
viewed as just deserts for a deviant population.”166  Additionally, policies 
allowing discrimination against the obese in health insurance illustrate the 
potential for discrimination.167 
However, government action in response to AIDS, a disease sometimes 
caused by sexual behavior, may demonstrate why nutrient disclosure can avoid 
the risk of stigmatization and discrimination.168  Stigmatization of the obese is 
similar to stigmatization of homosexual men with AIDS in that discriminatory 
attitudes toward both are often rooted in notions of moral failure and personal 
 
paternalism that purports to favor rather than harms black neighborhoods.  But this paternalism is double-
edged; it sends the message that some neighborhoods (and some groups) are subject to different standards than 
others.”). 
 162 See supra Part II.A.1.b. 
 163 See supra Part II.A.2. 
 164 Cf. Katherine Mayer, Note, An Unjust War: The Case Against the Government’s War on Obesity, 92 
GEO. L.J. 999, 1013–14 (2004) (“Any policy . . . that treats obesity as a problem that must be eliminated is 
likely to reinforce the perception that the obese are inferior.”). 
 165 Id. at 1018. 
 166 Id. 
 167 See Jacob Sullum, The War on Fat: Is the Size of Your Butt the Government’s Business?, REASON, 
Aug./Sept. 2004, at 20, available at http://www.reason.com/news/show/29238.html (referencing Richard 
Epstein’s proposal, made at the American Enterprise Institute’s conference on obesity, suggesting that 
employers and insurance companies should be able to discriminate based on weight). 
 168 See Mayer, supra note 164, at 1017 (comparing effective anti-AIDS policies with potential anti-obesity 
policies). 
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responsibility for the condition.169  Policies regarding AIDS considered the risk 
for stigmatization and for that reason “did not focus on restricting behavior” 
that may have posed civil liberties concerns—rather “the government 
disseminated information to enable people to make informed decisions about 
their behavior.”170  Nutrient disclosure at restaurants similarly uses information 
to help people make informed decisions about their behavior171 but does not 
restrict individual behavior or access to food—a major concern of “war on 
obesity” critics. 
III.  NATIONAL STANDARDS 
A labeling law created to deal with the information shortfall at restaurants 
should address the problem of overconsumption without being unduly 
burdensome to the regulated restaurants.  This Part will use several examples 
to demonstrate the patchwork problem, in which an industry is burdened by a 
variety of regulatory and enforcement schemes.  The menu labeling battle in 
California shows the restaurant industry’s preference for national uniform 
standards over a patchwork of regulations.  Additionally, the NLEA offers 
valuable precedent for creating a national standard for nutrition labeling. 
A. The Patchwork Problem and Economies of Scale 
According to the International Franchising Association, 56.3% of quick 
service restaurant establishments and 13.3% of table service restaurant 
establishments in the United States are franchises.172  The proliferation of 
franchises in the restaurant industry creates the need for uniform standards 
because it increases the likelihood that the same restaurant will operate in 
multiple jurisdictions. 
The restaurant industry prefers a national standard instead of a patchwork 
of jurisdictions with different standards.  According to the National Restaurant 
Association, the proliferation of different state and local laws mandating that 
 
 169 See J. Eric Oliver & Taeku Lee, Public Opinion and the Politics of Obesity in America, 30 J. HEALTH 
POL. POL’Y & L. 923, 928–29 (2005) (explaining the root of anti-obesity sentiments); see also Mayer, supra 
note 164, at 1017 (explaining that because homosexual men were badly stigmatized, anti-AIDS policies were 
careful to protect civil liberties). 
 170 Mayer, supra note 164, at 1017. 
 171 See supra Part II.A 
 172 INT’L FRANCHISE ASS’N, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF FRANCHISED BUSINESSES, NATIONAL OVERVIEW 
(2005), available at http://www.buildingopportunity.com/download/National%20views.pdf. 
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chain restaurants put nutrition information on menus has created “a growing 
patchwork of regulation that is not helpful to the consumer and is harmful to 
restaurateurs.”173  Similarly, the Coalition for Responsible Nutrition 
Information, an industry group consisting of restaurants, chain food service 
establishments, retailer associations, the Grocery Manufacturers Association, 
and restaurant associations, has stated: 
A handful of cities have adopted ordinances requiring disclosure of 
some nutrients, but the mandates on restaurants are inconsistent and 
confusing to consumers.  Providing nutrition information on a city-
by-city or state-by-state basis creates a patchwork quilt of confusing 
and contradictory local regulation that does not provide consumers 
with the detailed nutrition information they seek.174 
This policy position opposing state regulations should not be confused with 
a general anti-regulatory position as both the restaurant and grocery 
organizations support the LEAN Act in Congress.175  Complying with different 
disclosure requirements can be difficult for restaurateurs and others because 
doing so eliminates economies of scale and requires direct costs to monitor up 
to fifty different regulatory systems and create menus for each system.176  
Indirect costs associated with such things as different products, serving sizes, 
or packaging in different jurisdictions also increase.177 
B. The California Example 
An example from California demonstrates the preference of the restaurant 
industry for uniformity.  In 2007, state legislators sought to provide consumers 
with information to help them make consumption choices,178 but the bill was 
 
 173 Nat’l Rest. Ass’n, Public Policy Issue Brief: Menu Labeling/Nutrition Information, http://www. 
restaurant.org/government/issues/issue.cfm?Issue=menulabel (last visited Sept. 11, 2009). 
 174 Coal. for Responsible Nutrition Info., Frequently Asked Questions, http://www. 
nationalnutritionstandards.com/faq.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2009). 
 175 Nat’l Rest. Ass’n, supra note 173. 
 176 See David F. Welsh, Environmental Marketing and Federal Preemption of State Law: Eliminating the 
“Gray” Behind the “Green”, 81 CAL. L. REV. 991, 1003 (1993) (“Smaller companies may lack the resources 
necessary to monitor up to fifty possible variations in green marketing regulation.”). 
 177 See id. (using the food labeling costs, which “are literally incalculable” to explain the need for uniform 
green marketing standards (quoting Richard L. Frank, Food Labeling—The Case for National Uniformity, 34 
FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 512, 512 (1979))). 
 178 Press Release, Senator Alex Padilla, supra note 2.  Senator Padilla, a sponsor of the bill, said, “This is 
a huge victory for all those who care about public health.  When we talk about prevention, it begins with 
information.  It is difficult to make good choices about what we eat without good information.  This bill will 
provide that information.  The public has a right to know.”  Id. 
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staunchly opposed by the restaurant industry.179  Governor Arnold 
Schwarzenegger vetoed the measure that would have required certain chain 
restaurants operating within the state to post calorie, saturated fat, trans fat, 
carbohydrate, and sodium quantities on menus.180    The California Restaurant 
Association praised Governor Schwarzenegger for his veto of the law,181 which 
he said would “place burdens and costs upon some restaurant owners while 
imposing no burdens or costs on others” and would have “provide[d] 
restaurants with little flexibility for how they provide consumers with 
nutritional information.”182 
Within a year, both the restaurant industry and the Governor had changed 
their opinions of statewide menu labeling.183  During that time, the City and 
County of San Francisco,184 Santa Clara County,185 and San Mateo County186 
passed their own ordinances requiring nutrient disclosure at restaurants.187  
 
 179 Press Release, Cal. Rest. Ass’n, supra note 130.  According to the California Restaurant Association, 
the bill would have placed “an onerous and intrusive burden on restaurateurs” and would have had “no affect 
[sic] on obesity rates.”  The Association also said, “This bill is just a legislative ‘feel good’ Band-aid that 
ignores the true issues behind obesity while punishing restaurants.”  Id. 
 180 Bill Analysis, Senate Rules Committee, S.B. 120, 2007–2008 Sess. (Cal. 2008), available at http:// 
info.sen.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/sen/sb_0101-0150/sb_120_cfa_20080108_154841_sen_floor.html.  The law 
would have applied to restaurants with more than fourteen outlets in the state.  Id. 
 181 Press Release, Nat’l Rest. Ass’n, National Restaurant Association Praises Governor Schwarzenegger 
for Vetoing Menu Labeling Bill (Oct. 15, 2007), available at http://www.restaurant.org/pressroom/ 
pressrelease.cfm?ID=1507. 
 182 Veto Message, S.B. 120 (Oct. 14, 2007), available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/sen/sb_ 
0101-0150/sb_120_vt_20071014.html. 
 183 See infra notes 186–87.  See also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 114094 (West 2008). 
 184 S.F., CAL., HEALTH CODE art. 8, §§ 468.3–468.8 (2008), suspended by S.F., Cal., Ordinance No. 260–
08, S.F., CAL., HEALTH CODE art. 8, § 468.9 (2008).  The ordinance required the disclosure of calorie, 
saturated fat, carbohydrate, and sodium amounts next to or beneath each menu item.  Id.  See also Erin Allday, 
S.F. Supes Require Posting of Nutrition Info, S.F. GATE, Mar. 12, 2008, at C1 (explaining that the ordinance, 
which passed unanimously, defined a chain restaurant as a restaurant with twenty or more locations in 
California and was “aimed at curbing the fallout from Americans’ unhealthy eating habits, seen in rising rates 
of obesity and Type 2 diabetes”). 
 185 SANTA CLARA COUNTY, CAL., CODE OF ORDINANCES div. A18, ch. XXII (2008), repealed by Santa 
Clara County, Cal., Ordinance NS-300.795 (requiring chain restaurants to provide basic nutrient and calorie 
information to consumers). 
 186 SAN MATEO COUNTY, CAL., ORDINANCE No. 4436 adding Ch. 4.58 (Sept. 9, 2008), repealed by SAN 
MATEO COUNTY, CAL., ORDINANCE No. 4446 repealing Ch. 4.58 (Oct. 28, 2008) (repealing the ordinance after 
the enactment of a preemptive state law); San Mateo County Adopts Restaurant Menu Label Law, CBS5.COM, 
Aug. 13, 2008, http://cbs5.com/food/restaurant.menu.rules.2.794226.html. 
 187 The California Restaurant Association filed suit against the localities, arguing that the local laws were 
preempted by federal statute.  See California Restaurant Association Sues over San Francisco Menu Labeling, 
S.F. BUS. TIMES, July 7, 2008, http://sanfrancisco.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/stories/2008/07/07/daily15. 
html; Press Release, Cal. Rest. Ass’n, CRA Files Second Menu Labeling Lawsuit (July 23, 2008), available at 
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When a second statewide labeling law was proposed, the restaurant industry 
supported what it had previously opposed, preferring a statewide mandate to a 
patchwork of local requirements.188  The law was subsequently passed by the 
legislature and signed into law in September 2008;189 this time it was praised 
by Governor Schwarzenegger.190  California was the first state to implement a 
nutrient disclosure program, and cities nationwide have followed with similar 
plans, while several policymakers at the state and federal levels have proposed 
more widespread labeling requirements.191 
C. The NLEA: Uniform Food Labeling Precedent 
Uniform standards have been adopted in several other information 
disclosure programs.  For example, both the Federal Cigarette Labeling and 
Advertising Act of 1965, which requires warning labels on cigarette 
packaging, and the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which established a 
television ratings disclosure system, are national laws regarding the disclosure 
of product information.192  The most relevant statute to the restaurant labeling 
question is the NLEA, the nutritional labeling law for packaged food 
products.193 
The NLEA created a nationally uniform nutrition labeling law, establishing 
the “Nutrition Facts” label for packaged food sold in stores and creating 
standards for voluntary nutritional claims such as “Low Fat.”194  In enacting 
the NLEA, “Congress sought to free manufacturers from . . . fifty or more 
different labeling requirements and from the threat of fifty different type 
 
http://www.calrest.org/go/cra/news-events/news/press-releases/cra-files-second-menu-labeling-lawsuit/.  See 
also supra Part I.C. 
 188 Jim Sanders, California to Require Restaurant Calorie Disclosure, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 1, 2008, at 
17A (“The California Restaurant Association dropped its opposition and become a supporter of SB 1420 after 
deciding it makes sense to create a statewide standard, rather than comply with a mixture of local laws.”).  The 
new bill raised the minimum number of franchises required to trigger the mandate, and it allowed for 
brochures disclosing calories, fat, carbohydrates, and sodium, rather than requiring such labeling on the menu 
itself, from July 2009 until January 2011, when chain restaurants must provide only calorie content on menus 
or menu boards.  Id. 
 189 Press Release, Cal. Rest. Ass’n, Governor Signs Menu Labeling Legislation Creating Statewide 
Standards (Sept. 30, 2008), available at http://www.calrest.org/go/cra/news-events/newsroom/governor-signs-
menu-labeling-legislation-creating-statewide-standards/?keywords=menu%20labeling. 
 190 Press Release, Office of the Governor of the State of Cal., supra note 54. 
 191 See supra Part I. 
 192 Rebecca S. Fribush, Note, Putting Calorie and Fat Counts on the Table: Should Mandatory 
Nutritional Disclosure Laws Apply to Restaurant Foods?, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 377, 381–83 (2005). 
 193 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2006). 
 194 Id. 
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lawsuits . . . .”195  Congress agreed to preempt most inconsistent state labeling 
laws to get the support of the food industry, thus creating a uniform national 
standard.196  The “Nutrition Facts” label has come into general acceptance 
across the country, and studies show frequent and substantial direct use of the 
NLEA labels by consumers for point-of-purchase information.197 
IV.  PREEMPTION AND STATE AND LOCAL ROLES 
A federal law mandating calorie disclosure or more comprehensive labeling 
on menus or menu inserts would address the information shortfall with regard 
to restaurant food and may have significant effects on public behavior and 
public health.  However, states and localities should continue to address the 
obesity problem through means such as concurrent enforcement of labeling 
laws, supplemental labeling requirements, and labeling alternatives.  One 
scholar notes: 
Because there is no single cause of the obesity epidemic, solutions to 
the problem are unlikely to be simple or singular in nature.  Absent 
the appearance of some deus ex machina, such as a broadly effective 
anti-weight-gain pill with few side effects, which does not appear 
likely, remedies to this enormous social problem are going to have 
come from many angles and disciplines.198 
Any federal law addressing obesity should keep in mind the complex 
nature of the obesity problem and encourage experimentation on the state and 
local level.199  This Part will examine preemption options available to 
policymakers.  It will first address the possibility of concurrent enforcement 
power.  Second, it will discuss supplemental labeling requirements and the 
degree to which federal law should preempt those requirements.  It also 
suggests that the federal nutrient disclosure law should not preempt state 
common law claims.  Finally, this Part will outline additional state and local 
actions that may be taken to further address the obesity problem. 
 
 195 Michele M. Bradley, The States’ Role in Regulating Food Labeling and Advertising: The Effect of the 
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 649, 657 (1994). 
 196 Id. 
 197 D. I. Padberg, Nutritional Labeling as a Policy Instrument, 74 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1208, 1209–10 
(1992). 
 198 David G. Yosifon, Legal Theoretic Inadequacy and Obesity Epidemic Analysis, 15 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 681, 683 (2008). 
 199 See William W. Buzbee, Interaction’s Promise: Preemption Policy Shifts, Risk Regulation, and 
Experimentalism Lessons, 57 EMORY L.J. 145 (2007) (discussing experimentalists’ goals of policy innovation 
and adjustment). 
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A. Concurrent Power 
Allowing for concurrent enforcement power would give states the option to 
enforce a federal labeling law.  Section 307 of the Food Drug and Cosmetic 
Act (FDCA) allows for coordination of state and federal governments to 
enforce the NLEA.200  States must give notice to the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) and wait thirty days for the FDA to initiate its own 
action.201  If the FDA initiates an action and prosecutes, the state may 
intervene, but if the FDA settles, the state cannot initiate an action.202  This 
system allows for cooperation between states and the federal government and 
may be more effective than exclusive federal enforcement since there would be 
enforcement opportunities at both levels.203  State enforcement has a variety of 
other benefits: state enforcement bodies respond more rapidly, better 
understand local conditions, tend to be more flexible and innovative and less 
bureaucratic, and have more interaction with the regulated community.204 
States also could be given the power to adopt statutes identical to the 
federal one and enforce the law without the notice and coordination 
requirements necessary to enforce the federal law.205  Such a system would 
give states the option to become more or less involved in enforcement, and it 
would not create additional requirements for restaurants.  Therefore, the 
patchwork problem would not arise, and states would maintain a role in 
nutrition labeling enforcement.  During the passage of the NLEA, states 
generally supported the law because it allowed them have a role in enforcing 
the requirements.206 
B. Supplemental Labeling Requirements 
Because of the patchwork problem, state or local labeling laws that 
establish different standards for restaurants that are covered by the federal law 
 
 200 Craig Jordan, Preemption and Uniform Enforcement of Food Marketing Regulations, 49 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 401, 405–06 (1994). 
 201 Id. 
 202 Id. 
 203 See David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular Federal System: Can Three 
Not Be a Crowd When Enforcement Authority Is Shared by the United States, the States, and Their Citizens?, 
54 MD. L. REV. 1552, 1571 (1995) (noting the lack of resources for enforcement and asserting that “[s]trong 
state enforcement programs are invaluable within a federal system”). 
 204 Id. 
 205 See Jordan, supra note 200, at 406 (noting that under the NLEA, states that adopt parallel statutes do 
not have to give notice to the FDA or wait for an FDA response to bring their own action). 
 206 Bradley, supra note 195, at 657. 
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should be expressly preempted.207  However, states and localities should still 
be able to require labeling for restaurants that are not covered by federal law. 
1. Federal Floor and Ceiling 
Under the NLEA, states may adopt and enforce standards that are identical 
to the federal standards, but cannot require labeling that is not identical.  The 
NLEA thus creates a national standard.208  However, states may petition the 
FDA for exemptions from preemption in response to local concerns if: (1) the 
requirement will not cause any food to violate any federal law, (2) the 
requirement will not unduly burden interstate commerce, and (3) the 
requirement will address a particular need not met by the federal law.209  Given 
the patchwork problem, this generally preemptive but somewhat flexible 
standard makes sense for restaurant nutrient disclosure laws.210  Therefore, 
states should not have authority to require less stringent or more stringent 
restaurant nutrient disclosure measures unless the FDA gives them permission.  
While there are benefits to providing only a federal floor—such as maintaining 
the ability to experiment with different regulations211—the patchwork problem 
is overwhelming in this instance. 
2. Local Restaurant Menu Labeling 
It is possible that any federal law mandating nutrient disclosure would only 
apply to certain restaurants, such as those with a minimum number of outlets 
or which operate in interstate commerce.212  Because 56.3% of fast food 
 
 207 For instance, a state or local law that imposed a more rigid standard than the federal law would re-
create the very patchwork problem the federal law was meant to eliminate.  See Lainie Rutkow et al., 
Preemption and the Obesity Epidemic: State and Local Menu Labeling Laws and the Nutrition Labeling and 
Education Act, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 772, 777–79 (2008).  Express preemption is contrasted with implied 
preemption, under which courts conclude that the law is preempted because the federal law is meant to occupy 
the field (field preemption) or because the state and federal law conflict (conflict preemption).  Implied 
conflict preemption can result when the laws are mutually exclusive such that they cannot be complied with 
simultaneously, or when the state or local law impedes a goal of the federal law.  Id. 
 208 See Jordan, supra note 200, at 402 (listing several sections in which requirements that are not identical 
to the federal requirements are preempted). 
 209 Bradley, supra note 195, at 660. 
 210 See supra Part III. 
 211 Buzbee, supra note 199, at 145. 
 212 See Pomeranz & Brownell, supra note 18, at 1579–81 (“Most of proposed menu-labeling laws require 
compliance based on the number of units in an establishment’s chain . . . .”).  Both the MEAL and LEAN Acts 
proposed in Congress contain a minimum outlet requirement.  MEAL Act, H.R. 2426, 111th Cong. (2009); 
MEAL Act, S. 1048, 111th Cong. (2009); LEAN Act, S. 558, 111th Cong. (2009); LEAN Act of 2009, H.R. 
1398, 111th Cong. (2009).  Failure to create a jurisdictional hook could open the law to challenge under the 
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restaurants are franchises, fast food restaurants are more likely to satisfy the 
potential jurisdictional or outlet requirement than table service restaurants, of 
which only 13.3% are franchises.213  However, meals from table service 
restaurants are often larger and have more calories than meals from fast food 
restaurants.214  Failure to require disclosure at small chain or independent 
restaurants may skew consumers’ predictions about the nutrient content of 
those meals, causing them to think that restaurants that do not provide labels 
are healthier.215  For this reason, states and localities may want to impose 
restrictions on restaurants not covered by the federal law proposed here.  
Because these local laws would not conflict with federal law, supplemental 
labeling requirements should be permitted.  Whether these supplemental laws 
would be politically acceptable should be left to the states and localities 
considering them. 
C. State Common Law Suits 
Policymakers must also consider whether creating a national standard for 
labeling would preempt state common law claims that consumption of 
restaurant food contributed to consumers’ obesity.  Lawmakers should be 
explicit about whether the requirements of the federal law preempt only 
positive state law or whether state tort actions are also preempted.216 
There are a variety of reasons why state common law suits attempting to 
link restaurant food consumption to obesity have not been successful, even 
without nutrient disclosure laws.217  For example, several states have passed 
“Commonsense Consumption” laws, or “Cheeseburger Bills,” protecting 
manufacturers, marketers, distributors, and sellers of food from personal injury 
 
Commerce Clause.  See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (invalidating part of the Safe 
and Gun Free School Zones Act that contained “no jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-
by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce”); United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating part of the Violence Against Women Act that had no 
jurisdictional element). 
 213 INT’L FRANCHISE ASS’N, supra note 172. 
 214 Home-Cooking Beats Restaurants in Calories, supra note 21. 
 215 See supra Part II.A. 
 216 See David C. Vladeck, Preemption and Regulatory Failure, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 95, 99–100 (2005) 
(arguing that the Supreme Court’s decisions regarding this type of interpretation are unclear and erroneous). 
 217 See, e.g., Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (dismissing a failure to 
warn claim brought by restaurant patrons who were minors); Bonnie Hershberger, Supersized America: Are 
Lawsuits the Right Remedy?, 4 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 71, 86 (2008) (explaining that legal barriers to fast food 
lawsuits are immense).  This Comment maintains that a nutrient disclosure mandate is the preferred method of 
addressing restaurants’ contributions to obesity.  See discussion of problems with imposing tort liability, infra 
notes 228–31 and accompanying text. 
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claims connecting consumption of certain foods to weight gain.218  Similar 
federal bills were proposed in the 108th, 109th, 110th, and 111th sessions of 
Congress.219  With the adoption of a mandatory disclosure law, it may be even 
more difficult to bring such suits because nutrient disclosure will likely fulfill 
any duty to warn or disclose that might otherwise arise under state common 
law. 
It is conceivable, however, that in some cases it might be appropriate for 
consumers to sue restaurants under state common law; therefore, federal law 
mandating nutrient disclosure should not preempt such suits.  There are several 
risks associated with preempting state common law claims.  Federal 
preemption of these remedies may eliminate the corrective justice role of 
courts.220  Consumers have direct redressability through litigation and can be 
compensated for individual injuries.221  Second, litigation may establish 
optimal disclosure requirements for restaurants to follow, whereas a labeling 
law would impose minimum requirements that may not be enough to fully 
protect consumers.222  For example, while the NLEA establishes rules for use 
of advertising claims such as “Low Fat,”223 a court may find that compliance 
with the law was not enough to protect consumers in all cases.224  Common 
law liability may be particularly appropriate where a food company “knew 
advertisements for high calorie ‘low fat’ or ‘low carb’ foods would be 
understood by customers as assuring their usefulness as part of a weight 
reduction diet” and failed to protect consumers despite this knowledge.225  
Because statutes regulating industry often balance public health concerns with 
the desire to promote innovation or control cost, it is difficult to ensure that 
those statutes impose an adequate margin of safety in all circumstances.226  
 
 218 Kyle Graham, Why Torts Die, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 359, 404 (2008).  Twenty-three states have 
enacted such laws.  Id. 
 219 E.g., Commonsense Consumption Act, H.R. 812, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 220 THOMAS O. MCGARITY, THE PREEMPTION WAR 33 (2008). 
 221 Id. 
 222 See id. (“Without the incentive provided by common law rules, private entities will be guided only by 
the incentives provided by the regulatory laws.”); Stephen D. Sugarman & Nirit Sandman, Fighting Childhood 
Obesity Through Performance-Based Regulation of the Food Industry, 56 DUKE L.J. 1403, 1418 (2007) 
(“[A]gencies sometimes impose only minimum requirements, not optimal ones, and when that is the case, tort 
law could be more accurate in reflecting the socially desired course of action.”). 
 223 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2006). 
 224 MCGARITY, supra note 220, at 36–37 (“[J]uries should be allowed to conclude that the defendant 
should have taken additional measures to protect potential plaintiffs.”). 
 225 See Richard A. Daynard et al., Private Enforcement: Litigation as a Tool to Prevent Obesity, 25 J. 
PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 408, 409 (2004). 
 226 Vladeck, supra note 216, at 130. 
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State tort law can therefore provide a mechanism to impose that margin of 
safety and ensure more complete consumer protection.227 
Despite the benefits of allowing state common law claims, there are several 
problems with relying on a tort scheme to address the role restaurant food 
plays in obesity.  First, most restaurant food is not inherently dangerous or 
harmful.228  Moderate consumption of fast food does not create the dangers 
associated with overconsumption, and by burning excess calories, consumers 
can avoid the negative health consequences of being overweight.  Second, if 
the problem is a lack of information, establishing a direct system for providing 
such information is preferable to the slow definition of rights and duties 
through extensive litigation.229  Third, litigation could raise negative attitudes 
toward the obese by portraying obese people as opportunistic.230  Providing 
information about restaurant food through nutrient disclosure also fits neatly 
into the Pelman court’s list of appropriate areas to be regulated—packaged 
food, alcoholic beverages, and controlled substances—while it would be out of 
place with litigation addressing post-hoc harms, such as that involving 
asbestos, diet pills, and breast implants.231  For these reasons, a mandatory 
nutrient disclosure law is the most appropriate tool for requiring nutrient 
disclosure and fighting obesity, but the federal disclosure law should not 
foreclose the opportunity for consumers to bring state common law claims.  
State legislatures should decide if it is wise to allow such suits, and if so, state 
courts should have discretion to entertain consumer arguments. 
 
 227 Id. 
 228 See Daynard et al., supra note 225, at 408 (“Unlike tobacco, which is harmful when consumed in any 
quantity, food is necessary for life.”). 
 229 Courts could establish duties other than the duty to disclose, thereby mandating a remedy that is not 
based on providing consumers with appropriate information.  Beales et al., supra note 131, at 513 (“[W]here 
inefficient outcomes are the result of inadequate consumer information, information remedies will usually be 
the preferable solution.”).  While courts may eventually arrive at an appropriate disclosure rule, extensive 
litigation would be required to establish clearly defined rights and duties.  See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 120 (1999) (explaining that when the scope of rights are unclear, 
litigation rates will be high, especially at the appellate level, until precedents defining rights and duties are 
created).  But see Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357, 364 
(1984) (“[U]nder a well-functioning negligence rule, defendants should in principle generally have been 
induced to take due care; injured parties should recognize this and thus not bring suit.”).  There are a variety of 
possible duties that courts may choose to establish. Is there a duty to warn that foods are unhealthy?  To warn 
that foods that are perceived as healthy are not?  To protect children from unhealthy foods?  See, e.g., Caroline 
Fabend Bartlett, Comment, You Are What You Serve: Are School Districts Liable for Serving Unhealthy Food 
and Beverages to Students?, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 1053 (2004) (arguing that school districts have a duty to 
maintain a healthful environment).  
 230 Hershberger, supra note 217, at 90. 
 231 Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
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D. Adopting Alternatives to Labeling 
States and localities can implement, and have implemented, local initiatives 
and therefore do not present the patchwork problems that necessitate federal 
intervention.  These initiatives include community planning, such as zoning, 
and targeted sales restrictions, such as restrictions on the sale of unhealthy 
snacks in schools.  Other states and localities have banned particular 
ingredients such as artificial trans fats in restaurants.  In addition, many states 
and localities tax food items and ingredients that diminish public health.  These 
efforts do not interfere with other state or federal programs and can be tailored 
to specific community needs.232 
While many of these strategies have potential pitfalls233 and should be 
adopted only after careful balancing of potential costs and benefits, there is still 
value in permitting states and localities to develop different regulatory 
strategies to address specific community concerns.234  Small-scale 
experimentation with different approaches to combat obesity may generate 
valuable data for policymakers at all levels of government.235  Allowing state 
and local experimentation with other strategies may offset the loss of 
regulatory benefits due to the preemption of local labeling requirements.236  
Because the obesity problem is so multifaceted, the effectiveness of different 
strategies will vary.  For instance, studies have shown that banning sodas in 
schools has little effect on soda consumption.237  States and localities should 
continue to try such new strategies that address specific concerns of their 
communities but do not interfere with federal programs. 
 
 232 See Gorovitz et al., Preemption or Prevention? Lessons from Efforts to Control Firearms, Alcohol, and 
Tobacco, 19 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 36, 37–38 (1998) (explaining that arguments for preemption “ignore the 
wide variation in demographic, socioeconomic and other factors which lead to variations in risk across 
communities” and asserting that “local governments need additional authority to address additional risks that 
are relevant in their own communities”). 
 233 See supra Part II.B. 
 234 See Gorovitz et al., supra note 232, at 40 (explaining that “[b]eyond the areas of advertising and 
labeling . . . local governments have retained considerable authority to regulate the sale and use of cigarettes,” 
and noting that this authority has resulted in successful smoking ordinances and youth access restrictions). 
 235 See Buzbee, supra note 199, at 153 (outlining experimentalist literature). 
 236 William W. Buzbee, Introduction, in PREEMPTION CHOICE 1, 3 (William W. Buzbee ed., 
2009) (“[S]trong assertions of preemption can threaten to freeze the law or lead to neglect of changing 
discoveries about an underlying social ill.”); see also Buzbee, supra note 199, at 155 (“Unitary federal-choice 
ceiling preemption looks like a total disaster when examined in light . . . of experimentalist literature . . . .”). 
 237 See, e.g., Nagourney, supra note 57 (citing a study showing that soda bans in school have little effect 
on soda consumption of students); Parker-Pope, supra note 57 (citing an article in the Journal of Nutrition 
Education and Behavior that studied soda consumption by students in Maine and found no meaningful 
differences in overall soft drink consumption). 
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1. Community Planning and Targeted Sales Restrictions 
Community planning, which is undoubtedly within the domain of state and 
local governments, could be a valuable tool to combat obesity.238  For example, 
zoning has been used to ban fast food restaurants in certain areas.239  Localities 
can also use community planning and incentives to promote grocery stores that 
would make healthy food choices more accessible, to encourage health 
practitioners to operate in underserved areas, or to preserve public space for 
parks and sidewalks to encourage physical activity.240  Initiatives based on this 
local power should be preserved and encouraged,241 and valuable information 
regarding successes and failures of community experiments should be 
shared.242 
2. Ingredient Bans and Taxation of Ingredients 
An ingredient ban, such as a ban on artificial trans fats, is another tool that 
can be used by states and localities concerned about the health effects of 
certain foods.243  While some risk of a patchwork problem exists where certain 
states impose the ban and others do not, the burden is much smaller than that 
imposed under a patchwork of labeling regimes because there is only one 
potential restriction with which to comply instead of an entire regulatory 
regime with many components.  Furthermore, because trans fats are quickly 
disappearing from food products through voluntary reformulation244 and 
legislatures are aggressively banning artificial trans fats in schools and 
restaurants,245 it is possible that in the near future most food will be virtually 
trans fat free. 
 
 238 See Cynthia A. Baker, Bottom Lines and Waist Lines: State Governments Weigh In on Wellness, 5 IND. 
HEALTH L. REV. 185, 187, 193–98 (2008) (“[C]ommunity design efforts may be the states’ strongest suit in 
making a difference in our state of wellness.”). 
 239 Id. at 195. 
 240 Id. at 194–96 (outlining efforts taken in states such as New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and New Mexico). 
 241 See Breighanne Aileen Fisher, Comment, Community-Based Efforts at Reducing America’s Childhood 
Obesity Epidemic: Federal Lawmakers Must Weigh In, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 711, 738–39 (2006). 
 242 Buzbee, supra note 199. 
 243 See supra Part I.B. 
 244 See Choi, supra note 51, at 507 (“Beginning in 2003, major food companies voluntarily undertook 
significant steps to remove trans fat as an ingredient in their food products . . . . [I]n recent years food 
companies have been actively exploring ways to squeeze trans fat out of their products.”). 
 245 Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 49. 
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Additionally, states and localities should be free to experiment with 
taxation of certain food products or ingredients,246 as research shows that such 
taxation reduces consumption of the targeted products.247  Furthermore, 
taxation does not create the patchwork problems associated with labeling laws. 
CONCLUSION 
The federal government should adopt a law mandating nutrient disclosure 
on menus or in inserts presented with menus.  At the very least, the disclosure 
should include caloric content of regular menu items at restaurants engaged in 
interstate commerce.  The exact requirements regarding the format of 
disclosure, scope of covered nutrients, and applicability of the requirements to 
small, intrastate restaurants should be determined through consultation with 
experts and cooperation with states and localities. 
There are, of course, risks and costs associated with a labeling program.  
For instance, restaurants could substitute ingredients with fewer calories but in 
doing so might expose the public to different risks, such as possible risks from 
artificial sweeteners or artificial fats.  However, it is better to provide 
information, monitor the effects of the disclosure, and, if need be, to require 
further disclosure of certain potentially harmful ingredients than to allow 
members of the public to remain in the dark about the food they eat. 
Additionally, critics may note that some data on menu labels would not be 
entirely accurate because of custom ordering, imprecise measuring in kitchens, 
and the use of fresh foods.248  However, as long as the federal law requires 
only a reasonable range of accuracy for the nutrient data of a product based on 
normal preparation, restaurants can escape falling victim to unreasonable 
lawsuits or enforcement actions.  Nutrient disclosure won’t end the obesity 
problem, but giving people power over their consumption is a good place to 
start. 
DEVON E. WINKLES∗ 
 
 246 See supra Part I.B. 
 247 Jacobson & Brownell, supra note 60. 
 248 McCann, supra note 68, at 1193. 
 ∗ Executive Marketing Editor, Emory Law Journal; J.D. Candidate, Emory University School of Law 
(2010); B.A., University of Virginia (2007).  The author wishes to thank Professor William W. Buzbee for his 
invaluable guidance, the Emory Law Journal staff members for their assistance in the editorial process, and her 
family and friends for their constant support and encouragement. 
